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Abstract
This article outlines a program of ethnoontology that brings
together empirical research in the ethnosciences with onto-
logical debates in philosophy. First, we survey empirical evi-
dence from heterogeneous cultural contexts and disciplines.
Second, we propose a model of cross-cultural relations
between ontologies beyond a simple divide between uni-
versalist and relativist models. Third, we argue for an inte-
grative model of ontology building that synthesizes insights
from different fields such as biological taxonomy, cognitive
science, cultural anthropology, and political ecology. We
conclude by arguing that a program of ethnoontology pro-
vides philosophers both with insights about traditional
issues such as debates about natural kinds and with novel
strategies for connecting philosophy with pressing global
issues such as the conservation of local environments and
the self-determination of Indigenous communities.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Philosophers often imagine cross-cultural variation of ontologies through ethnographic thought experiments such as
Quine's (1960) “gavagai” and anecdotes such as the infamous “Eskimo words for snow” (Martin, 1986). In contrast to
such imagined ontological alternatives, academic philosophy has paid astonishingly little attention to empirical
research on cross-cultural diversity of ontologies. Although there is a growing body of research on ontology building
in fields such as ethnobotany, ethnoecology, and ethnomedicine, there has been barely any discussion of empirical
research on local ontological systems in academic philosophy. This article outlines ethnoontology as an empirically
informed approach to ontological issues in cross-cultural contexts. After surveying empirical evidence about ontol-
ogy building in Indigenous and other local communities, we show how an empirically informed methodology can
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contribute to rethinking philosophical debates about issues such as universalism and relativism. We also argue that
ethnoontology can connect ontological debates in academic philosophy to applied questions about local livelihoods
and sustainability in global contexts. Ethnoontology therefore complements developments in African (e.g., Gyekye,
1995), Asian (e.g., Asakura, 2011), and Indigenous American (e.g., Maffie, 2014) philosophy that emphasize the need
to broaden the geographical scope of metaphysical and ontological debates in academic philosophy.
2 | CROSS-CULTURAL ONTOLOGICAL VARIATION—THE STATE OF
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
By “ontology” here, we mean the way that the world is organized according to a particular cultural group. Ontologies
include an inventory of the types of things that exist, the classes that they sort themselves into, the properties they
have, and relations they stand in. “Category” here generically refers to the elements of ontologies. Categories are not
identical with concepts (forms of mental representation), they are not invariably lexicalized or otherwise explicitly
marked, and they do not necessarily constitute kinds (causally or explanatorily robust clusters of properties).
Cross-cultural relations between ontologies can be addressed across a wide range of domains from stars and
meteorological phenomena to social institutions and emotions. Ethnotaxonomy of animals and plants has become
one of the most established research programs for comparing categories across cultures (Albuquerque & Alves,
2016; Berlin, 1992). Developing in opposition to relativist traditions in cultural anthropology, ethnobiology of the
1960s and 1970s formulated strong universalist programs that emphasized cross-cultural stability of biological cate-
gories (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973; Diamond, 1966; Hunn, 1977). Drawing on empirical evidence of cross-
cultural similarity, many ethnobiologists embraced metaphysical accounts of biological species as natural kinds that
are recognized in otherwise heterogeneous cultures. For example, Diamond (1966) investigated bird categories
among the Fore amana ake in Papua New Guinea and compored local ethnotaxa with categories employed by aca-
demic taxonomists. Diamond not only found cross-cultural categorical stability but also a metaphysical justification:
“The nearly one-to-one correspondence between Fore amana ake and and species as recognized by European taxon-
omists reflects the objective reality of the gaps separating sympatric species” (1966, p. 1103).
Although cross-cultural stability continues to be a topic of ethnobiological research (Begossi et al., 2008), there
has also been increased focus on the cross-cultural variation of biological ontologies. Indeed, cross-cultural stability
has been well-confirmed in some areas (e.g., many mammal taxa) but also has to be qualified through different levels
of analysis (e.g., higher taxa or varieties), biological domains (e.g., invertebrates or fungi), or sociocultural (e.g., eco-
nomic or spiritual) importance. Increased interest in cross-cultural differences between biological ontologies has also
been shaped by the growing role of applied and normative concerns in ethnobiology (Nabhan, 2016). Much of this
research is focused on the unique cultural expressions of biological knowledge and its contributions to maintaining
livelihoods and environments. In ontological terms, this research investigates how local concerns and values can
become reflected in local categories (Ludwig, 2016). For example, local concerns about ecological roles and behaviors
of birds can contribute to categories that depart from academic taxonomy because they are shaped by different sets
of criteria (Alcántara-Salinas, Ellen, & Rivera-Hernández, 2016).
Although ethnobiology has been at the center of many controversies about cross-cultural relations of catego-
ries, a wide range of ethnosciences have emerged in the second half of the 20th century including ethnoecology,
ethnomedicine, ethnopedology, ethnophysiography, and ethnosociology (Rist & Dahdouh-Guebas, 2006). Many of
these ethnosciences do not engage with traditional examples of natural kinds such as biological species, and
research in these fields therefore tends to be less inclined to emphasize cross-cultural stability. For example,
ethnopedological research on local soil categories (Barrera-Bassols, 2016) and ethnophysiographic research on
landscape categories (Mark, Turk, & Stea, 2010) tend to emphasize the importance of local concerns in ontology
building. Landscapes are divided up according to a mixture of inherent geologic and hydrologic features, ecologi-
cal structure, and affordance of culture-specific uses, including not only shelter, agriculture, and wayfinding but
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also ritual practices such as pilgrimage, worship, and sacrificial offerings. Consequently, a traditional farmer who
addresses soil types through suitability for specific farming practices will draw different distinctions than a West-
ern soil scientist (Ludwig, 2017). An Aboriginal hunter will employ a separate taxonomy of landscape features
than an urban American who may mostly think in terms of broad categories such as river, mountain, or valley.
Among the Yolngu people, for example, landscapes are composed of cosmologically significant sites distinguished
by their links with ancestral beings (Tilley, 1994). These sites' boundaries are delimited by features that are
reflected in a rich vocabulary of place-specific topographic and environmental descriptions many of which also
track recurrent patterns of ecological resources (Morphy, 1991).
While there is a growing number of ethnosciences, not all empirical research into local ontologies is explicitly for-
mulated with an “ethno”-prefix. Much recent work in sensory anthropology and sensory history has focused on the
ways that distinctive ontological significance is given to sensory experiences across cultures (Classen, 1993; Smith,
2007). For example, among the Semelai and Semaq Beri of Malaysia, odor plays a central cultural role (Kruspe &
Majid, Forthcoming). Kinds of game animals and other foods are categorized by smell, as are people. Everyday life is
governed by a complex system of ritual prohibitions centered around these odor categories, often backed by the
intervention of supernatural entities. Odors are invoked as weapons in shamanic rituals and believed capable of
transmitting messages to the spirit world—the wrong odors can offend the thunder deity and bring about disaster.
Similar powers are ascribed to odor by the Kwoma people of Papua New Guinea, who hold that even inanimate
objects such as spears and yams are sensitive to “odor contamination” resulting from ritual violations and will
respond unfavorably to it (Howes, 2003). Sounds play a comparable role in other cultures, especially when reliance
on vision is less reliable thanks to the prevalence of dense forest cover (Feld, 2012).
The wider context of cultural anthropology also involves debates about the “ontological turn” that has captured
the imagination of anthropological theory (Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017) but remains largely disconnected from onto-
logical debates in academic philosophy (however, see Palecek & Risjord, 2013). Much of the most prominent litera-
ture of the ontological turn focuses on differences between Indigenous and Western perspectives and tends to
articulate ontological difference through Indigenous metaphysics and deep differences regarding issues such as ani-
mism, totemic bonds, forest spirits, or shamanic transformations (Descola, 2013; Viveiros de Castro, 2014). Consider
the perspectivism that Viveiros de Castro (1998) discerns in Amerindian cultures. According to the perspectivist cos-
mology, humans and animals possess the same type of soul, imbued with identical perceptual, cognitive, and voli-
tional capacities. In virtue of this, humans and, for example, jaguars perceive the world identically: jaguars also see
themselves as having human-like bodies and mannerisms, see humans (potential prey) as tapirs, the blood that they
drink as being manioc beer, their coats as fine clothing, etc. Thus, when shamans wear animal skins, they aim to
transform their own bodies into those of the animals so they may act within the same world that they do. Drawing
on such cases, proponents of the ontological turn emphasize that “nature” itself is not a natural kind, but a contested
and unstable category (Descola, 2013).
However, just as ethnobiological claims of cross-cultural similarity need qualification, so do claims of radical onto-
logical difference. Consider the animism debate. Animists consider nonhuman entities (e.g., plants, forests, or rivers)
as intentional actors (Harvey, 2005). There is substantial evidence that animism is a widespread metaphysical view.
For example, the Nayaka people of South India consider not only certain animals but also stones, hills, cups, and
knives to be devaru: beings that stand in active, quasi-social relationships with them (Bird-David, 1999). Devaru are
aspects of a larger kin structure that incorporates potential “partners” in the nonhuman world. In addition to these
ethnographic observations, there are intriguing cross-cultural similarities in animist ontologies. Indigenous communi-
ties around the world tend to be much more permissive in their ascription of intentionality than Western participants
(Ojalehto, Douglas, & García, 2017).
This evidence emphasizes animism as a coherent form of ontological difference that is unevenly distributed.
However, there are also arguments that depict animism as a more general tendency across all human cultures. For
example, the precise bounds of intentionality are far from settled even in Western science, as illustrated through
heated controversies about plant cognition (Adams, 2018). Some anthropologists of the ontological turn have
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combined ethnographic documentation of animism with general philosophical arguments in favor of more permissive
ontologies of intentional beings and personhood (Bennett, 2010; Harvey, 2005). These go further in claiming not
only that animist commitments are widespread but also that some form of animism is plausibly true. Finally, some
critics have attempted to deflate radical difference claims by arguing that animism is not a genuine ontological option
but instead a pervasively mistranslated system of metaphors (Peterson, 2011; Wilkinson, 2017). The latter
difference-erasing strategy raises difficult issues that we cannot pursue here about the methodological constraints
on positing profound ontological difference (Davidson, 1973).
3 | BEYOND UNIVERSALISM AND RELATIVISM
The complexity of ethnoscientific evidence challenges both simple versions of ontological universalism and relativism
along descriptive, epistemological, and metaphysical levels of analysis. On the descriptive level, Ludwig (2016) has
suggested replacing simple universalist and relativist models with an account of “partially overlapping ontologies.”
On the one hand, there is substantial cross-cultural overlap between ontological systems that provides common gro-
und for communication and collaboration. For example, overlap in biological ontologies allows local communities and
academic researchers to refer to the same species and ecological phenomena. Shared ontological elements facilitate
joint action and enable the pursuit of collective goals that span these distinct cultural groups. As such, the search for
areas of ontological overlap constitutes the basis for co-management and conservation that have become widely
embraced in environmental and sustainability sciences (Berkes, 2018). At the same time, ontological overlaps are typ-
ically only partial and need to be supplemented by recognition of unique cultural elements in ontology building. A
model of partial overlaps therefore provides an alternative to overemphasis of either similarity or difference and
avoids overly optimistic accounts of seamlessly shared worlds, as well as overly pessimistic accounts of incommensu-
rability without any possibility of mutual understanding.
On the epistemic level, partial overlaps can be analyzed through the influence of local concerns and purposes in
ontology building. Ethnosciences often address categories that are “anthropic” (Weiskopf, 2018) in the sense that
they are shaped by distinct practical purposes and modes of representation. Often this results in categories that
crosscut those of biological systematics. For example, kinds of plants may be distinguished partonomically (by mor-
phological features such as stems, leaves, bark, and roots), but these parts in turn are grouped by their medicinal,
nutritional, and ritual uses—that is, by their role in specifically human practices. Similar phenomena occur in classifica-
tions of minerals and other material substances, for example, the chemically distinct, but religiously and artisanally
valued gems collectively categorized as “turquoises” by the Aztecs. The anthropic character of everyday categories
can explain why ontological overlaps are only partial insofar as different purposes drive the formation of different
categories. At the same time, similarity in purposes can also drive categorical similarity. A traditional hunter in the
Amazon and the Congo rainforest may be culturally distinct in many ways but also share similar concerns in behav-
ioral or morphological traits of animals that can lead to overlapping criteria in ontology building.
While ontological overlap can be the product of overlapping purposes, ontological similarities can also persist in
the light of disparate practical concerns. The reason is that categories are anthropic to different degrees and ethno-
sciences often also include categories that remain stable in the contexts of very different purposes. In this sense,
Weiskopf's (2018) account of anthropic categories can be complemented with Franklin-Hall's (2015) account of nat-
ural kinds as “categorical bottlenecks […] that not only best serve us, with our idiosyncratic aims and cognitive capac-
ities, but also those of a wide range of alternative agents.” The simultaneous presence of (and the continuum
between) anthropic and bottleneck categories provides a model for understanding empirical findings of partial onto-
logical overlaps. For example, think of an Indigenous hunter and conservation scientist. While there may be some
overlap in practical purposes (e.g., shared interest in monitoring population size of a hunted species), there are also
plenty of differences in concerns that generate differences between ontologies. At the same time, some categories
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such as salient mammal species may exhibit a strong bottleneck character in the sense that heterogeneous actors will
largely agree on the boundaries even in the light of highly diverse practical interests.
The interplay between anthropic and bottleneck categories provides an epistemological model for understanding
partial overlaps but can be supplemented by a metaphysical discussion of the structural grounds of anthropic and
bottleneck features. Anthropic characteristics of categories require recognition of the heterogeneity of properties
and patterns in the natural and social world that allow the construction of different ontological systems (Ludwig,
2018b; Weiskopf, 2018). For example, Indigenous soil categories can reflect patterns of properties that are highly
relevant for local agricultural practices such as suitability for certain crops, occurrence of relevant weeds, morpholog-
ical features that allow identification (soil color, amount of gravel, etc.), and chemical properties that underlie both
morphological features and agricultural suitability. Even if this pattern is highly salient and relevant for an Indigenous
farmer, a Western soil scientist may build her ontology along different properties and relations and therefore end up
with very different distinctions between soil categories.
At the same time, properties may cluster in stable ways that ground the suitability of categories for different pur-
poses, and therefore ground the bottleneck character of some categories (Boyd, 1999; Slater, 2015). For example,
consider jaguar as a distinct category that is recognized by Indigenous communities across the Americas as well as
Western taxonomists. Jaguars are clearly distinct from any other Felidae in the Americas along a large variety of
criteria such as morphology, phylogenetics, behavior, or ecological roles. An Indigenous hunter and a Western taxon-
omist may therefore pay attention to very different properties (say animal behavior vs. genetic features) and still end
up recognizing jaguars as distinct from other cats in the Americas such as pumas, bobcats, or ocelots. The scope and
stability of property clustering therefore allows the formation of bottleneck categories that contribute to cross-
cultural ontological stability despite heterogenous practical purposes.
To sum up, empirically informed ethnoontology requires a complex story about the relations between ontologies
beyond simple universalist and relativist models. As summarized in Figure 1, such a complex story can be told along
descriptive, epistemic, and metaphysical levels. On the descriptive level, cross-cultural evidence requires acknowl-
edgement of “partial overlaps” that include common ground in converging categories as well as diverging elements
that lead to distinctly local ontological systems. On the epistemic level, partial overlaps can be connected to the
“anthropic” and “bottleneck” characters of categories that result in different degrees of purpose dependency. On the
metaphysical level, these epistemic features can be explained through the scope and stability of property clusters
that make the categories more or less dependent on the presence of certain purposes.
4 | A SYSTEMS MODEL OF ONTOLOGY BUILDING
A model of partially overlapping ontologies provides a helpful starting point for relating ontological systems across
cultures but also raises further questions about different practices of ontology building. Research in fields such as
ethnobiology, ethnoecology, and ethnomedicine tends to be highly interdisciplinary and brings together evidence
from diverse disciplines such as biological taxonomy, cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology, and political ecol-
ogy. At the same time, this interdisciplinarity has also been a source of tension between researchers from different
intellectual traditions who approach ontology building through the lens of heterogeneous and sometimes competing
methodologies. For example, there is substantial research from both natural and social sciences that involves both
quantitative and qualitative methods (ethnographic documentation, biological surveys, controlled psycholinguistic
experiments, etc.) and often raises contentious issues such as the role of decolonial and other political projects in sci-
entific research. At least heuristically, one can distinguish between four different centers of attention in debates
about ontology building in the ethnosciences.
First, there is a long tradition of objectivist perspectives in ethnosciences that focus on “discontinuities in nature”
(Hunn, 1977) in the sense of empirically discovered property clusters. In this tradition, ontology building is primarily
understood as a process of empirical discovery, even as a proto-scientific enterprise, and cross-cultural convergence
is emphasized as the outcome of joint recognition of the same material discontinuities in the natural world (Berlin,
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1992). Ethnobiological frameworks in the second half of the 20th century (see Hunn, 2007, for a historical overview)
often integrate seamlessly into philosophical frameworks of ontological realism (Sider, 2011) that postulate one
metaphysically privileged strategy of carving nature at its joints that is recognized across otherwise highly diverse
cultural contexts.
Second, cognitivist perspectives (Atran, 1990, cf. Ludwig, 2018a) emphasize shared cognitive processes in per-
ceiving and categorizing the natural world. Objectivist and cognitivist perspectives share a focus on cross-cultural
similarities in ontology building but the latter shifts the explanans at least partly from the external world into the
mind by emphasizing universal aspects of human cognition such as shared standards of perceptual salience or even
highly specialized cognitive modules. For example, Atran and Medin (2007) argue for a universally shared
folkbiological module that shapes ontology building across cultures and therefore constrains cross-cultural variation.
In a similar vein, psychological essentialists (Gelman, 2003) argue that natural, social, and artifactual categories are
cognitively organized around intrinsic, often internal causal–explanatory features, and that this explains numerous
facts about human categorization cross culturally and developmentally.
Third, culturalist perspectives approach ontology building as a distinctly local practice and often contrast with
cognitivist accounts in emphasizing that ontologies are shaped by sociocultural factors ranging from economic con-
cerns to spiritual significance. Cultural anthropology emphasizes the embeddedness of ontology in wider patterns of
life, such as everyday rituals for handling food or preparing weapons, constructing habitats or decorating bodies, and
F IGURE 1 137 × 212 mm (72 × 72
DPI)
6 of 11 LUDWIG AND WEISKOPF
systems of organizing social relations (Wagner, 1981). Accordingly, ethnotaxonomic studies often identify highly spe-
cific cultural factors in ontology building. For example, Bulmer's (1967) classic discussion notes the spiritual relations
between cassowaries and humans in Papua New Guinea as a core factor in the exclusion of cassowaries from the
bird category of the Kalam people.
Fourth, the increased recognition of Indigenous activism and political ecology in ethnosciences has contributed
to an emphasis on ontology building as a process of political negotiation and contestation (Chao, 2018; Ludwig,
2016). As ontological differences often express different purposes and values, preservation of Indigenous and other
local heritage can also become a matter of preservation of ontological difference. Furthermore, collaboration
between different actors like local communities and academic researchers often raises questions about the role of
different ontologies in practice and policy. The clearest articulation of such a political reading of ontology building is
Viveiros de Castro's (2014) notion of “ontological self-determination” that frames justice for Amazonian communities
in terms of keeping Indigenous control over local ontologies.
While it is possible to locate different points of emphasis in the ethnoscientific literature, the heterogeneity of
local categories suggests that none of them can provide a comprehensive model in isolation. First, different case
studies suggest that emphasis on different factors as some categories requires attention to material factors or gen-
eral cognitive processes while others will illustrate distinct forms of cultural interpretation or political contestation.
For example, consider biological categories: some mammal taxa such as jaguar will require emphasis on cross-
culturally recognized discontinuities, while other categories such as tree invite reflection on human perception. Yet
others such as Bulmer's cassowaries demand attention to local cultural dynamics.
Furthermore, cultures do not come divided up into neatly separable components. Consequently, all four dimen-
sions tend to interact with each other in the formation of local categories. For example, think of landscape categories
that reflect (a) material topographical features and (b) general factors of perceptual salience but also (c) distinct cul-
tural interpretations such as the Aboriginal use of landscapes for navigation and (d) political questions about the
preservation of local categories as a prerequisite for the preservation of a group's historical memory and ways of life.
As summarized in Figure 2, ontology building therefore has to be understood through interaction of all four factors
and their shifting importance depending on the category in question.
5 | LOCATING ETHNOONTOLOGY IN PHILOSOPHICAL ONTOLOGY
Ethnoontology challenges philosophers to engage with complex ethnographic evidence beyond classical thought
experiments such as “gavagai” and anecdotes such as “Eskimo words for snow.” Why should philosophers accept this
challenge of engaging with the cross-cultural complexity of ontological systems rather than addressing ontological
questions through more traditional methods such as thought experiments involving carefully constructed possible
worlds? In conclusion, we provide both an internal and an external reason for philosophers to embrace
ethnoontology.
First, ethnoontology can advance ontological debates in philosophy by challenging theorists to reflect on the
empirical complexity of ontological systems. For example, consider debates about natural kinds and essentialism in
the context of the heterogeneous web of cross-cultural similarities and differences between ontological systems.
The four-factor model sketched here suggests that the cultural construction of categories will not center on essential
internal property clusters, but rather incorporate wider sets of roles and relations, both practical and symbolic.
Indeed, given the cross-cultural prevalence of transformations that transgress ontological boundaries, it is unclear
how widespread such essentialist beliefs themselves are. This is consistent with research showing cultural differ-
ences in the degree to which categories are essentialized and that essentialism can be a strategy deployed to serve a
matrix of power relations (Astuti, 2007; Hale, 2015; Mahalingam, 2003; Olivola & Machery, 2014; Ryazanov &
Christenfeld, 2018).
In philosophical discussions, natural kinds are the paradigmatic examples of essentialized categories. It is com-
mon, though, for social categories (race, ethnicity, and class status) to be “naturalized”: that is, treated as if they were
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natural categories with intrinsic essences (Gil-White, 2001; Prentice & Miller, 2007). The ethnoontological perspec-
tive presented here suggests that the reverse process is also possible. Many “natural” kinds can be de-naturalized
and treated as existing in relation to human social, economic, ritual, and evaluative practices. If this is true, then
purely natural kinds may not be a default way of dividing up the world, but a relative rarity confined to contexts of
highly regimented and self-conscious inquiry such as the sciences themselves. Ethnoontological research provides
important resources to move beyond a simple divide between “natural” and “conventional” kinds (Ludwig, 2018a)
towards empirically informed discussions about kinds that exhibit different degrees of causal unification (e.g., Khalidi,
2013) and are suitable for different epistemic purposes (e.g., Franklin-Hall, 2015).
For another example, consider debates about the role of non-epistemic values in ontology building. While many
ontologists have acknowledged that ontologies reflect non-epistemic concerns (Conix, 2018; Ludwig, 2016; Mikkola,
2015), the four-factor model of ethnoontology can provide a much richer account of social concerns in ontology
building while simultaneously acknowledging the importance of material and cognitive factors in the sense of
Figure 2. Both debates about natural kinds and non-epistemic values illustrate how philosophical debates can benefit
from engaging with the empirical complexity of ontology building across cultures. Indeed, contemporary science
itself is, from this perspective, just another newly invented culture, and therefore not an exception to the general
model presented here. In this sense, ethnoontology contributes to wider naturalistic approaches in ontology that
“aim to learn from science's classificatory practices and offer a fuller understanding of those practices” (Ereshefsky,
2018) rather than developing ontological claims independently of empirical research.
Second, ethnoontology also contributes to more socially relevant ontological debates in nonacademic and global
contexts. Indigenous and other local ontologies are not just philosophically intriguing but also a crucial component of
practices and traditions that support the livelihoods of local communities. In this sense, local ontologies are an impor-
tant part of local cultural heritage and questions about their roles become deeply political issues (Viveiros de Castro,
2014). For example, how should ontological differences be negotiated if they suggest different ways of relating to
F IGURE 2 Categories of objects like species, landscapes, and social groups are shaped by different (cognitive,
material, cultural, political) factors. The contribution of these factors (strength of the solid arrows) varies between
categories. Furthermore, factors interact with each other (dotted arrows), requiring a systemic perspective on
category formation (Ludwig, 2018c)
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environments and different ways of organizing conservation policy (Nadasdy, 2003)? How should concerns about
ecological sustainability and the knowledge rights of traditional cultures be balanced against the desire to share the
fruits of rich ethnomedical knowledge (Pushpangadan, George, Ijinu, & Rajasekharan, 2017; Voeks, 2018)? The study
of ethnoontology presents an opportunity to address links between general issues in philosophical taxonomy and
applied questions about pressing global challenges ranging from conservation of local environments to the self-
determination of Indigenous communities (Ludwig & Poliseli, 2018).
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